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NOTICE: [*1] 
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to change pending release of the final published version. 
PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. State v. 
Tovar, 656 N. W.2d 112, 2003 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 32 (Iowa, 2003) 
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
SYLLABUS: At respondent Tovar's November 1996 arraignment for operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol (OWI), in response to the trial court's questions, Tovar affirmed that he wanted to 
represent himself and to plead guilty. Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy 
and public jury trial where he would have the right to counsel who could help him select a jury, question 
and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and make arguments on his behalf. By pleading guilty, the 
court cautioned, Tovar would give up his [*2] right to a trial and his rights at that trial to be represented by 
counsel, to remain silent, to the presumption of innocence, and to subpoena witnesses and compel their 
testimony. The court then informed Tovar of the maximum and minimum penalties for an OWI conviction, 
and explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty 
of the charged offense. To that end, the court informed Tovar of the two elements of the OWI charge: The 
defendant must have (1) operated a motor vehicle in Iowa (2) while intoxicated. Tovar confirmed, first, that 
on the date in question, he was operating a motor vehicle in Iowa and, second, that he did not dispute the 
result of the intoxilyzer test showing his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. The 
court then accepted his guilty plea and, at a hearing the next month, imposed the minimum sentence of two 
days in jail and a fine. In 1998, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a second offense, an 
aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. Represented by counsel in that proceeding, he pleaded guilty. In 
2000, Tovar was charged with third-offense OWI, a class "DM felony under [*3] Iowa law. Again 
represented by counsel, Tovar pleaded not guilty to the felony charge. Counsel moved to preclude use of 
Tovar's first (1996) OWI conviction to enhance his 2000 offense from an aggravated misdemeanor to a 
third-offense felony. Tovar maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid — not fully knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary - because he was never made aware by the court of the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation. The trial court denied the motion, found Tovar guilty, and sentenced him on the OWI 
third-offense charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and 
remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction. Holding that the 
colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been constitutionally inadequate, Iowa's high 
court ruled, as here at issue, that two warnings not given to Tovar are essential to the "knowing and 
intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea stage: The defendant must be advised 
specifically that waiving counsel's assistance in deciding whether to plead guilty (1) entails the risk that a 
viable defense will be overlooked [*4] and (2) deprives him of the opportunity to obtain an independent 
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. 
Held: Neither warning ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The 
constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges 
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments 
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Pp. 8-15. 
(a) The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical 
stages" of the criminal process, see, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 
477, including a plea hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (per 
curiam). Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his first OWI conviction, he had a right to 
counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. Although an accused may choose to forgo representation, 
any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and [*5] intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. The information a defendant must possess in order to 
make an intelligent election depends on a range of case-specific factors, including his education or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See 
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. Although warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding 
to trial uncounseled must be "rigorously" conveyed, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 US. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S Ct. 2525, a less 
searching or formal colloquy may suffice at earlier stages of the criminal process, 487 U.S., at 299, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. In Patterson, this Court described a pragmatic approach to right-to-counsel 
waivers, one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in 
question, and what assistance [counsel] could provide to an accused at that stage." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Less rigorous warnings are required pretrial because, at that stage, "the full dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious [*6] to an accused than 
they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389. Pp. 8-11. 
(b) The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two admonitions ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court. "The 
law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully 
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances . . . . " 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450. Even if the defendant lacked a 
full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, the State may 
nevertheless prevail if it shows that the information provided to the defendant satisfied the constitutional 
minimum. Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Iowa high court gave 
insufficient consideration to this Court's guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding 
them necessary in every guilty plea instance, that court overlooked this Court's observations that the 
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend upon the particular facts and 
circumstances in each case, Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Moreover, as 
Tovar acknowledges, [*7] in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden 
to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Tovar has never claimed 
that he did not fully understand the 1996 OWI charge or the range of punishment for that crime prior to 
pleading guilty. He has never "articulated with precision" the additional information counsel could have 
provided, given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 
2389. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. 
Before this Court, he suggests only that he may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to 
counsel at trial, but not if he was, instead, going to plead guilty. Given "the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding [this] case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019, it is 
far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened 
Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the two 
admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him, [*8] i.e., the 
warnings might be misconstrued to convey that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could 
plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain 
hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt 
disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or 
the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. States are free to 
adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful, but 
the Federal Constitution does not require the two admonitions here in controversy. Pp. 11-15. 
656 N. W. 2d 112, reversed and remanded. 
JUDGES: GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
OPINIONBY: GINSBURG 
OPINION: 
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all 
critical stages of the criminal process. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 
477 (1985); United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S Ct. 1926 (1967). [*9] The 
entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a "critical stage" at which the 
right to counsel adheres. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S Ct. 2006 (1972)\ 
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the 
right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a "knowing, intelligent 
act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before 
accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation. 
Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to 
be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that 
"waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense 
will be overlooked"; and (2) "admonish" the defendant "that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose 
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on [*10] whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is 
wise to plead guilty"? 656 N. W.2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003). The Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings 
essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 
Ibid. 
We hold that neither warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is 
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be 
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty 
plea. 
I 
On November 2, 1996, respondent Felipe Edgardo Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was 
arrested in Ames, Iowa, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI). See Iowa 
Code § 321J.2 (1995). nl An intoxilyzer test administered the night of Tovar's arrest showed he had a 
blood alcohol level of 0.194. App. 24. The arresting officer informed Tovar of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602 (1966). Tovar signed a form stating that he waived 
those rights and agreed to answer questions. Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public [*11] Safety, OWI 
Supplemental Report 3 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner; Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety, 
Rights Warnings (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner. 
nl "A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor 
vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an 
alcoholic beverage . . . . b. While having an alcohol concentration . . . of .10 or more." Iowa Code § 
321J.2(1) (1995). 
Some hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County. 
The judge indicated on the Initial Appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived 
application for court-appointed counsel. Initial Appearance in No. OWCR 23989 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging 
of Petitioner. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar was "informed of the charge and his 
. . . rights and received a copy of the Complaint." Ibid. Arraignment was set for November 18, 1996. In the 
interim, [*12] Tovar was released from jail. 
At the November 18 arraignment, n2 the court's inquiries of Tovar began: "Mr. Tovar appears without 
counsel and I see, Mr. Tovar, that you waived application for a court appointed attorney. Did you want to 
represent yourself at today's hearing?" App. 8-9. Tovar replied: "Yes, sir." Id., at 9. The court soon after 
asked: "How did you wish to plead?" Tovar answered: "Guilty." Ibid. Tovar affirmed that he had not been 
promised anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty. Id., at 13-14. 
n2 Tovar appeared in court along with four other individuals charged with misdemeanor 
offenses. App. 6-10. The presiding judge proposed to conduct the plea proceeding for the five cases 
jointly, and each of the individuals indicated he did not object to that course of action. Id., at 11. 
Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule 
Crim. Proc. 8 (1992), n3 the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, [*13] he would be entitled 
to a speedy and public trial by jury, App. 15, and would have the right to be represented at that trial by an 
attorney, who "could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present 
evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf," id., at 16. By 
pleading guilty, the court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of any kind on the 
charge against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be represented by an attorney at that trial." Ibid. The 
court further advised Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain silent at 
trial, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and compel their 
testimony. Id., at 16-19. 
n3 The Rule has since been renumbered 2.8. 
Turning to the particular offense with which Tovar had been charged, the court informed him that an 
OWI conviction carried a maximum penalty [*14] of a year in jail and a $ 1,000 fine, and a minimum 
penalty of two days in jail and a $ 500 fine. Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed that he understood his exposure to 
those penalties. Ibid. The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure 
itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense. Id., at 21-22. To that end, the court informed 
Tovar that the OWI charge had only two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was operating a 
motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, when he did so, he was intoxicated. Id., at 23. Tovar confirmed 
that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute the 
results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood alcohol 
level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. Id., at 23-24. 
After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar if he still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that 
he did. Id., at 27-28. The court then accepted Tovar's plea, observing that there was "a factual basis" for it, 
and that Tovar had made the plea "voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, [*15] [and] . . . of 
the consequences of [pleading guilty]." Id., at 28. 
On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for sentencing on the OWI charge n4 and, simultaneously, for 
arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license. Id., at 45-46; see Iowa Code § 
321J.21 (1995). n5 Noting that Tovar was again in attendance without counsel, the court inquired: "Mr. 
Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an 
attorney to represent you?" App. 46. n6 Tovar replied that he would represent himself. Ibid. The court then 
engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the suspension charge as it had on the OWI charge the 
previous month. Id., at 48-51. After accepting Tovar's guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court 
sentenced him on both counts: For the OWI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two 
days in jail and a $ 500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension conviction, the court imposed a 
$ 250 fine, plus a surcharge and costs. Id., at 55. 
n4 At that stage, it was still open to Tovar to request withdrawal of his guilty plea on the OWI 
charge and to substitute a plea of not guilty. See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992). [*16] 
n5 In order to appear at the OWI arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse despite the 
suspension of his license; he was apprehended en route home. App. 50, 53. 
n6 Prior to asking Tovar whether he wished to hire counsel, the court noted that Tovar had 
applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his application had been denied because he was 
financially dependent upon his parents. Id., at 46. Tovar does not here challenge the absence of 
counsel at sentencing. 
On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of OWI for a second time. He was represented by counsel in 
that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 24, n. 1. 
On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a third offense, see Iowa 
Code § 321J.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while license barred, see § 321.561. Iowa law 
classifies first-offense OWI as a serious misdemeanor and second-offense OWI as an aggravated 
misdemeanor. § § 321J.2(2)(a)-(b). Third-offense OWI, and any OWT offenses thereafter, rank as class 
"D" felonies. § 321J.2(2)(c). Represented [*17] by an attorney, Tovar pleaded not guilty to both December 
2000 charges. Record 55. 
In March 2001, through counsel, Tovar filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law Points; then7 motion 
urged that Tovar's first OWI conviction, in 1996, could not be used to enhance the December 2000 OWI 
charge from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. App. 3-5. n8 Significantly, 
Tovar did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996 arraignment of his right to counsel prior to 
pleading guilty and at the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid ~ 
not "full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" — because he "was never made aware by the court. . . of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id., at 3-4. 
n7 See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 10(2) (1992) ("Any defense, objection, or request which is 
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by 
motion."); State v. Wilt, 333 N. W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for 
adjudication of law points under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material facts are 
undisputed). [* 18] 
n8 Tovar conceded that the 1998 OWI conviction could be used for enhancement purposes. 
Record 60. 
The court denied Tovar's motion in May 2001, explaining: "Where the offense is readily understood by 
laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only 
that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to counsel and a willingness to proceed without 
counsel in the face of such awareness." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37 (brackets in original). Tovar then 
waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the court of both the OWI third-offense charge and 
driving while license barred. Id., at 33. Four months after that adjudication, Tovar was sentenced. On the 
OWI third-offense charge, he received a 180-day jail term, with ail but 30 days suspended, three years of 
probation, and a $ 2,500 fine plus surcharges and costs. App. 70-71. For driving while license barred, Tovar 
received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the OWI sentence, and a suspended $ 500 fine. Id., at 
71. 
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, [*19] App. to Pet. for Cert. 23-30, but the Supreme Court of 
Iowa, by a 4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first 
OWI conviction, 656 N. W.2d 112 (2003). Iowa's highest court acknowledged that "the dangers of 
proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a 
jury trial, [therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be different." Id., at 119. The court 
nonetheless held that the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been 
constitutionally inadequate, and instructed dispositively: 
"[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be 
advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. . . . The trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that 
there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving 
the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be 
overlooked. [*20] The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose 
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise 
to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges 
against him and the range of allowable punishments." Id., at 121. n9 
n9 The dissenting justices criticized the majority's approach as "rigid" and out of line with the 
pragmatic approach this Court described in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988). 656 N. W. 2d, at 122. They noted that, in addition to advice concerning 
the constitutional rights a guilty plea relinquishes, Tovar was "made fully aware of the penal 
consequences that might befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. , 156 L. Ed. 2d 703, 124 S. Ct. 44(2003), in view of the division of 
opinion on the requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes for waiver of counsel [*21] at a plea hearing, 
compare, e.g., United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146-1147 (CA9 2002), with State v. Cashman, 491 
N. W.2d 462, 465-466 (S. D. 1992), and we now reverse the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court. 
II 
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical 
stages" of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 
477\ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224, 18 L. Ed 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926. A plea hearing qualifies as 
a "critical stage." White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050. Because Tovar 
received a two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage 
and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 
530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. 
A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation. While the Constitution 
"does not force a lawyer upon a defendant," Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87 
L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942), it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent, [*22] see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 
(1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI plea hearing, was 
insufficiently informed, and therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did 
not elaborate on the value, at that stage of the case, of an attorney's advice and the dangers of self-
representation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent 15. nlO 
nlO The United States as amicus curiae reads our decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 US. 367, 59 
L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), to hold that a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a 
misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term of imprisonment, affords no 
ground for disturbing the underlying conviction. Amicus accordingly contends that the Constitution 
should not preclude use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance the penalty for a 
subsequent offense, regardless of the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 11, n. 3. The State, however, does not contest the Iowa Supreme Court's 
determination that a conviction obtained without an effective waiver of counsel cannot be used to 
enhance a subsequent charge. See ibid. We therefore do not address arguments amicus advances 
questioning that premise. See also id., at 29, n. 12. 
[*23] 
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant "knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with eyes open." Adams, 317 U.S., at 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236. We have not, 
however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed 
without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election, our 
decisions indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See 
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. 
As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se, 
he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 
95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in Faretta resisted counsel's aid, preferring to represent 
himself. The Court held that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that right, 
however, we cautioned: "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in 
order competently [*24] and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is 
doing " Id., at 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988), we elaborated 
on "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to which Faretta referred. "At trial," we 
observed, "counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and 
evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively . . ., 
object to improper prosecution questions, and much more." 487 U.S., at 299, n. 13, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 
S. Ct. 2389. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel, we therefore said, must be 
"rigorously" conveyed. Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We clarified, however, that at 
earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice. Id., at 299, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. 
Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we 
held, the warnings required [*25] by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 161. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 
(1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment rights, but of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel as well. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Miranda 
warnings, we said, effectively convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning. In 
addition, they inform him of the "ultimate adverse consequence" of making uncounseled admissions, i.e., 
his statements may be used against him in any ensuing criminal proceeding. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Miranda warnings, we added, "also sufficed . . . to let [the defendant] know what 
a lawyer could 'do for him,"' namely, advise him to refrain from making statements that could prove 
damaging to his defense. 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. 
Patterson describes a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," one that asks "what purposes a 
lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide 
to an accused at that stage," in order "to determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and 
the type of warnings and procedures that should be required before a waiver [*26] of that right will be 
recognized." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We require less rigorous warnings pretrial, 
Patterson explained, not because pretrial proceedings are "less important" than trial, but because, at that 
stage, "the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious to 
an accused than they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
In Tovar's case, the State maintains that, like the Miranda warnings we found adequate in Patterson, 
Iowa's plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure that his guilty 
plea is informed and voluntary. Brief for Petitioner 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to 
the State, "makes plain that an attorney's role would be to challenge the charge or sentence," and therefore 
adequately conveys to the defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of self-representation. Brief 
for Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other hand, defends the precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme 
Court, see supra, at 7-8, as essential to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea stage [*27] waiver of 
counsel. Brief for Respondent 15. 
To resolve this case, we need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the plea colloquy 
was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more 
in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel at his Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed 
that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see supra, at 3, and declined the court's offer of 
"time to hire an attorney" at sentencing, when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea, see 
supra, at 4-5, and n. 4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant must be alerted to his right to the 
assistance of counsel in entering a plea. See Brief for Petitioner 19 (acknowledging defendant's need to 
know "retained or appointed counsel can assist" at the plea stage by "working on the issues of guilt and 
sentencing"). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume that Tovar was informed of his 
entitlement to counsel's aid or, at least, to have pretermitted that issue. See 656 N. W. 2d, at 117. 
Accordingly, the State presents a narrower question: "Does the Sixth Amendment [*28] require a court to 
give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an 
attorney, that an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that 
without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense?" Pet. for Cert. i. 
Training on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, the particular language the Iowa Supreme Court 
employed in announcing the warnings it thought the Sixth Amendment required: "The trial judge [must] 
advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by 
laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the 
risk that a viable defense will be overlooked," 656 N. W. 2d, at 121; in addition, "the defendant should be 
admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent 
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty," ibid. Tovar did not 
receive such advice, and the sole question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment compels the two 
admonitions here in controversy. [*29] nl 1 We hold it does not. 
nl 1 The Supreme Court of Iowa also held that "the court must ensure the defendant understands 
the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments." 656 N. W. 2d, at 121. 
The parties do not dispute that Tovar was so informed. 
This Court recently explained, in reversing a lower court determination that a guilty plea was not 
voluntary: "The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the 
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the 
circumstances ~ even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking 
it." United States v. Ruiz, 536 US. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450 (2002) (emphasis in 
original). We similarly observed in Patterson: "If [the defendant] . . . lacked a full and complete 
appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that 
the information it provided [*30] to him satisfied the constitutional minimum." 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 
2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa Supreme Court gave insufficient 
consideration to these guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in 
every guilty plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the 
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will "depend, in each case, upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. 
Ct. 1019; supra, at 9. 
Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the 
defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of 
counsel. See Watts v. State, 257 N. W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977); Brief for Respondent 5, 26-27. In that light, 
we note that Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment 
for the crime prior to pleading guilty. Further, he has never "articulated with precision" the additional 
information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the [*31] charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., 
at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; supra, at 4. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right 
to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he "may have been 
under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead 
guilty." Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added). nl2 
nl2 The trial court's comment that Tovar appeared without counsel at the arraignment and the 
court's inquiry whether Tovar wanted to represent himself at that hearing, see App. 8-9, hardly lend 
support to Tovar's suggestion of what he "may have" believed. See also id., at 46 (court's inquiry at 
sentencing whether Tovar "wanted to take some time to hire an attorney"); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8 
(2)(a) (1992) ("at any time before judgment," defendant may request withdrawal of guilty plea and 
substitution of not guilty plea). 
Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case," see Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 [*32] it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa 
Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In 
a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might 
confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court 
declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that 
the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays 
his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal 
charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the 
defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be 
wasted. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28-29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. 
We note, finally, that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance 
of an uncounseled plea they deem useful. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a) [*33] (2003); Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.111(d) (2003); Md. Ct. Rule 4-215 (2002); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 5.02 (2003); Pa. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 121, comment (2003). We hold only that the two admonitions the Iowa Supreme Court ordered 
are not required by the Federal Constitution. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
SYLLABUS: At respondent Tovar's November 1996 arraignment for operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol (OWI), in response to the trial court's questions, Tovar affirmed that he wanted to 
represent himself and to plead guilty. Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy 
and public jury trial where he would have the right to counsel who could help him select a jury, question 
and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and make arguments on his behalf. By pleading guilty, the 
court cautioned, Tovar would give up his [*2] right to a trial and his rights at that trial to be represented by 
counsel, to remain silent, to the presumption of innocence, and to subpoena witnesses and compel their 
testimony. The court then informed Tovar of the maximum and minimum penalties for an OWI conviction, 
and explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty 
of the charged offense. To that end, the court informed Tovar of the two elements of the OWI charge: The 
defendant must have (1) operated a motor vehicle in Iowa (2) while intoxicated. Tovar confirmed, first, that 
on the date in question, he was operating a motor vehicle in Iowa and, second, that he did not dispute the 
result of the intoxilyzer test showing his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. The 
court then accepted his guilty plea and, at a hearing the next month, imposed the minimum sentence of two 
days in jail and a fine. In 1998, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a second offense, an 
aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. Represented by counsel in that proceeding, he pleaded guilty. In 
2000, Tovar was charged with third-offense OWI, a class "D" felony under [*3] Iowa law. Again 
represented by counsel, Tovar pleaded not guilty to the felony charge. Counsel moved to preclude use of 
Tovar's first (1996) OWI conviction to enhance his 2000 offense from an aggravated misdemeanor to a 
third-offense felony. Tovar maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid — not fully knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary - because he was never made aware by the court of the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation. The trial court denied the motion, found Tovar guilty, and sentenced him on the OWI 
third-offense charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and 
remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction. Holding that the 
colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been constitutionally inadequate, Iowa's high 
court ruled, as here at issue, that two warnings not given to Tovar are essential to the "knowing and 
intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea stage: The defendant must be advised 
specifically that waiving counsel's assistance in deciding whether to plead guilty (1) entails the risk that a 
viable defense will be overlooked [*4] and (2) deprives him of the opportunity to obtain an independent 
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. 
Held: Neither warning ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The 
constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges 
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments 
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Pp. 8-15. 
(a) The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical 
stages" of the criminal process, see, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 
477, including a plea hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 US 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (per 
curiam). Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his first OWI conviction, he had a right to 
counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. Although an accused may choose to forgo representation, 
any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and [*5] intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. The information a defendant must possess in order to 
make an intelligent election depends on a range of case-specific factors, including his education or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See 
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. Although warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding 
to trial uncounseled must be "rigorously" conveyed, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S Ct. 2389; see Faretta v. California, 422 US. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S Ct. 2525, a less 
searching or formal colloquy may suffice at earlier stages of the criminal process, 487 U.S., at 299, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. In Patterson, this Court described a pragmatic approach to right-to-counsel 
waivers, one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in 
question, and what assistance [counsel] could provide to an accused at that stage." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Less rigorous warnings are required pretrial because, at that stage, "the full dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious [*6] to an accused than 
they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389. Pp. 8-11. 
(b) The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two admonitions ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court. "The 
law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully 
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances . . .." 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450. Even if the defendant lacked a 
full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, the State may 
nevertheless prevail if it shows that the information provided to the defendant satisfied the constitutional 
minimum. Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Iowa high court gave 
insufficient consideration to this Court's guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding 
them necessary in every guilty plea instance, that court overlooked this Court's observations that the 
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend upon the particular facts and 
circumstances in each case, Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Moreover, as 
Tovar acknowledges, [*7] in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden 
to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Tovar has never claimed 
that he did not fully understand the 1996 OWI charge or the range of punishment for that crime prior to 
pleading guilty. He has never "articulated with precision" the additional information counsel could have 
provided, given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 
2389. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. 
Before this Court, he suggests only that he may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to 
counsel at trial, but not if he was, instead, going to plead guilty. Given "the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding [this] case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019, it is 
far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened 
Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the two 
admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him, [*8] i.e., the 
warnings might be misconstrued to convey that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could 
plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain 
hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt 
disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or 
the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. States are free to 
adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful, but 
the Federal Constitution does not require the two admonitions here in controversy. Pp. 11-15. 
656 N. W. 2d 112, reversed and remanded. 
JUDGES: GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
OPINIONBY: GINSBURG 
OPINION: 
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all 
critical stages of the criminal process. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 
477 (1985)] United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967). [*9] The 
entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a "critical stage" at which the 
right to counsel adheres. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US 25, 34, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S Ct. 2006 (1972)\ 
White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the 
right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a "knowing, intelligent 
act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before 
accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation. 
Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to 
be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that 
"waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense 
will be overlooked"; and (2) "admonish" the defendant "that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose 
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on [*10] whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is 
wise to plead guilty"? 656 N. W.2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003). The Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings 
essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 
Ibid. 
We hold that neither warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is 
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be 
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty 
plea. 
I 
On November 2, 1996, respondent Felipe Edgardo Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was 
arrested in Ames, Iowa, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI). See Iowa 
Code § 321J.2 (1995). nl An intoxilyzer test administered the night of Tovar's arrest showed he had a 
blood alcohol level of 0.194. App. 24. The arresting officer informed Tovar of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602 (1966). Tovar signed a form stating that he waived 
those rights and agreed to answer questions. Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public [*11] Safety, OWI 
Supplemental Report 3 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner; Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety, 
Rights Warnings (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner. 
nl "A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor 
vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an 
alcoholic beverage . ... b. While having an alcohol concentration . . . of .10 or more." Iowa Code § 
32112(1) (1995). 
Some hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County. 
The judge indicated on the Initial Appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived 
application for court-appointed counsel. Initial Appearance in No. OWCR 23989 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging 
of Petitioner. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar was "informed of the charge and his 
. . . rights and received a copy of the Complaint." Ibid. Arraignment was set for November 18, 1996. In the 
interim, [*12] Tovar was released from jail. 
At the November 18 arraignment, n2 the court's inquiries of Tovar began: "Mr. Tovar appears without 
counsel and I see, Mr. Tovar, that you waived application for a court appointed attorney. Did you want to 
represent yourself at today's hearing?" App. 8-9. Tovar replied: "Yes, sir." Id., at 9. The court soon after 
asked: "How did you wish to plead?" Tovar answered: "Guilty." Ibid. Tovar affirmed that he had not been 
promised anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty. Id., at 13-14. 
n2 Tovar appeared in court along with four other individuals charged with misdemeanor 
offenses. App. 6-10. The presiding judge proposed to conduct the plea proceeding for the five cases 
jointly, and each of the individuals indicated he did not object to that course of action. Id., at 11. 
Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule 
Crim. Proc. 8 (1992), n3 the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, [*13] he would be entitled 
to a speedy and public trial by jury, App. 15, and would have the right to be represented at that trial by an 
attorney, who "could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present 
evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf," id., at 16. By 
pleading guilty, the court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of any kind on the 
charge against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be represented by an attorney at that trial." Ibid. The 
court further advised Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain silent at 
trial, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and compel their 
testimony. Id., at 16-19. 
n3 The Rule has since been renumbered 2.8. 
Turning to the particular offense with which Tovar had been charged, the court informed him that an 
OWI conviction carried a maximum penalty [*14] of a year in jail and a $ 1,000 fine, and a minimum 
penalty of two days in jail and a $ 500 fine. Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed that he understood his exposure to 
those penalties. Ibid. The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure 
itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense. Id., at 21-22. To that end, the court informed 
Tovar that the OWI charge had only two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was operating a 
motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, when he did so, he was intoxicated. Id., at 23. Tovar confirmed 
that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute the 
results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood alcohol 
level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. Id., at 23-24. 
After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar if he still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that 
he did. Id., at 27-28. The court then accepted Tovar's plea, observing that there was "a factual basis" for it, 
and that Tovar had made the plea "voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, [*15] [and] . . . of 
the consequences of [pleading guilty]." Id., at 28. 
On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for sentencing on the OWI charge n4 and, simultaneously, for 
arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license. Id., at 45-46; see Iowa Code § 
321J.21 (1995). n5 Noting that Tovar was again in attendance without counsel, the court inquired: "Mr. 
Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an 
attorney to represent you?" App. 46. n6 Tovar replied that he would represent himself. Ibid. The court then 
engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the suspension charge as it had on the OWI charge the 
previous month. Id., at 48-51. After accepting Tovar's guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court 
sentenced him on both counts: For the OWI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two 
days in jail and a $ 500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension conviction, the court imposed a 
$ 250 fine, plus a surcharge and costs. Id., at 55. 
n4 At that stage, it was still open to Tovar to request withdrawal of his guilty plea on the OWI 
charge and to substitute a plea of not guilty. See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992). [*16] 
n5 In order to appear at the OWI arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse despite the 
suspension of his license; he was apprehended en route home. App. 50, 53. 
n6 Prior to asking Tovar whether he wished to hire counsel, the court noted that Tovar had 
applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his application had been denied because he was 
financially dependent upon his parents. Id., at 46. Tovar does not here challenge the absence of 
counsel at sentencing. 
On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of OWI for a second time. He was represented by counsel in 
that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 24, n. 1. 
On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a third offense, see Iowa 
Code § 321J.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while license barred, see § 321.561. Iowa law 
classifies first-offense OWI as a serious misdemeanor and second-offense OWI as an aggravated 
misdemeanor. § § 321J.2(2)(a)-(b). Third-offense OWI, and any OWI offenses thereafter, rank as class 
"D" felonies. § 321J.2(2)(c). Represented [*17] by an attorney, Tovar pleaded not guilty to both December 
2000 charges. Record 55. 
In March 2001, through counsel, Tovar filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law Points; then7 motion 
urged that Tovar's first OWI conviction, in 1996, could not be used to enhance the December 2000 OWI 
charge from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. App. 3-5. n8 Significantly, 
Tovar did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996 arraignment of his right to counsel prior to 
pleading guilty and at the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid -
not "full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" — because he "was never made aware by the court . . . of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id., at 3-4. 
n7 See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 10(2) (1992) ("Any defense, objection, or request which is 
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by 
motion."); State v. Wilt, 333 N. W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for 
adjudication of law points under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material facts are 
undisputed). [*18] 
n8 Tovar conceded that the 1998 OWI conviction could be used for enhancement purposes. 
Record 60. 
The court denied Tovar's motion in May 2001, explaining: "Where the offense is readily understood by 
laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only 
that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to counsel and a willingness to proceed without 
counsel in the face of such awareness." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37 (brackets in original). Tovar then 
waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the court of both the OWI third-offense charge and 
driving while license barred. Id., at 33. Four months after that adjudication, Tovar was sentenced. On the 
OWI third-offense charge, he received a 180-day jail term, with all but 30 days suspended, three years of 
probation, and a $ 2,500 fine plus surcharges and costs. App. 70-71. For driving while license barred, Tovar 
received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the OWI sentence, and a suspended S 500 fine. Id., at 
71. 
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, [*19] App. to Pet. for Cert. 23-30, but the Supreme Court of 
Iowa, by a 4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first 
OWI conviction, 656 N. W.2d 112 (2003). Iowa's highest court acknowledged that "the dangers of 
proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a 
jury trial, [therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be different." Id., at 119. The court 
nonetheless held that the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been 
constitutionally inadequate, and instructed dispositively: 
"[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be 
advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. . . . The trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that 
there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving 
the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be 
overlooked. [*20] The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose 
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise 
to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges 
against him and the range of allowable punishments." Id., at 121. n9 
n9 The dissenting justices criticized the majority's approach as "rigid" and out of line with the 
pragmatic approach this Court described in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988). 656 N. W. 2d, at 122. They noted that, in addition to advice concerning 
the constitutional rights a guilty plea relinquishes, Tovar was "made fully aware of the penal 
consequences that might befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. , 156 L. Ed. 2d 703, 124 S. Ct. 44(2003), in view of the division of 
opinion on the requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes for waiver of counsel [*21] at a plea hearing, 
compare, e.g., United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146-1147 (CA9 2002), with State v. Cashman, 491 
N. W.2d 462, 465-466 (S. D. 1992), and we now reverse the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court. 
II 
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical 
stages" of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 
477\ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926. A plea hearing qualifies as 
a "critical stage." White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050. Because Tovar 
received a two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage 
and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 
530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. 
A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation. While the Constitution 
"does not force a lawyer upon a defendant," Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87 
L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942), it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent, [*22] see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 
(1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI plea hearing, was 
insufficiently informed, and therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did 
not elaborate on the value, at that stage of the case, of an attorney's advice and the dangers of self-
representation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent 15. nlO 
nlO The United States as amicus curiae reads our decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 
L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), to hold that a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a 
misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term of imprisonment, affords no 
ground for disturbing the underlying conviction. Amicus accordingly contends that the Constitution 
should not preclude use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance the penalty for a 
subsequent offense, regardless of the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 11, n. 3. The State, however, does not contest the Iowa Supreme Court's 
determination that a conviction obtained without an effective waiver of counsel cannot be used to 
enhance a subsequent charge. See ibid. We therefore do not address arguments amicus advances 
questioning that premise. See also id., at 29, n. 12. 
[*23] 
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant "knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with eyes open." Adams, 317 U.S., at 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236. We have not, 
however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed 
without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election, our 
decisions indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See 
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. 
As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se, 
he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 
95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in Faretta resisted counsel's aid, preferring to represent 
himself. The Court held that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that right, 
however, we cautioned: "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in 
order competently [*24] and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is 
doing " Id., at 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988), we elaborated 
on "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to which Faretta referred. "At trial," we 
observed, "counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and 
evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively . . ., 
object to improper prosecution questions, and much more." 487 U.S., at 299, n. 13, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 
S. Ct. 2389. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel, we therefore said, must be 
"rigorously" conveyed. Id, at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We clarified, however, that at 
earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice. Id., at 299, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261,108S. Ct. 2389. 
Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we 
held, the warnings required [*25] by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 
(1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment rights, but of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel as well. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Miranda 
warnings, we said, effectively convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning. In 
addition, they inform him of the "ultimate adverse consequence" of making uncounseled admissions, i.e., 
his statements may be used against him in any ensuing criminal proceeding. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Miranda warnings, we added, "also sufficed . . . to let [the defendant] know what 
a lawyer could 'do for him,"' namely, advise him to refrain from making statements that could prove 
damaging to his defense. 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. 
Patterson describes a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," one that asks "what purposes a 
lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide 
to an accused at that stage," in order "to determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and 
the type of warnings and procedures that should be required before a waiver [*26] of that right will be 
recognized." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We require less rigorous warnings pretrial, 
Patterson explained, not because pretrial proceedings are "less important" than trial, but because, at that 
stage, "the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious to 
an accused than they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
In Tovar's case, the State maintains that, like the Miranda warnings we found adequate in Patterson, 
Iowa's plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure that his guilty 
plea is informed and voluntary. Brief for Petitioner 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to 
the State, "makes plain that an attorney's role would be to challenge the charge or sentence," and therefore 
adequately conveys to the defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of self-representation. Brief 
for Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other hand, defends the precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme 
Court, see supra, at 7-8, as essential to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea stage [*27] waiver of 
counsel. Brief for Respondent 15. 
To resolve this case, we need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the plea colloquy 
was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more 
in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel at his Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed 
that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see supra, at 3, and declined the court's offer of 
"time to hire an attorney" at sentencing, when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea, see 
supra, at 4-5, and n. 4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant must be alerted to his right to the 
assistance of counsel in entering a plea. See Brief for Petitioner 19 (acknowledging defendant's need to 
know "retained or appointed counsel can assist" at the plea stage by "working on the issues of guilt and 
sentencing"). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume that Tovar was informed of his 
entitlement to counsel's aid or, at least, to have pretermitted that issue. See 656 N. W. 2d, at 117. 
Accordingly, the State presents a narrower question: "Does the Sixth Amendment [*28] require a court to 
give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an 
attorney, that an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that 
without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense?" Pet. for Cert. i. 
Training on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, the particular language the Iowa Supreme Court 
employed in announcing the warnings it thought the Sixth Amendment required: "The trial judge [must] 
advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by 
laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the 
risk that a viable defense will be overlooked," 656 N. W. 2d, at 127; in addition, "the defendant should be 
admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent 
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty," ibid. Tovar did not 
receive such advice, and the sole question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment compels the two 
admonitions here in controversy. [*29] nl 1 We hold it does not. 
nl 1 The Supreme Court of Iowa also held that "the court must ensure the defendant understands 
the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments." 656 N. W. 2d, at 121. 
The parties do not dispute that Tovar was so informed. 
This Court recently explained, in reversing a lower court determination that a guilty plea was not 
voluntary: "The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the 
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the 
circumstances — even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking 
it." United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450 (2002) (emphasis in 
original). We similarly observed in Patterson: "If [the defendant] . . . lacked a full and complete 
appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that 
the information it provided [*30] to him satisfied the constitutional minimum." 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 
2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa Supreme Court gave insufficient 
consideration to these guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in 
every guilty plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the 
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will "depend, in each case, upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. 
Ct. 1019;supra, at9. 
Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the 
defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of 
counsel. See Watts v. State, 257 N. W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977); Brief for Respondent 5, 26-27. In that light, 
we note that Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment 
for the crime prior to pleading guilty. Further, he has never "articulated with precision" the additional 
information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the [*31] charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., 
at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; supra, at 4. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right 
to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he "may have been 
under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead 
guilty." Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added). nl2 
nl2 The trial court's comment that Tovar appeared without counsel at the arraignment and the 
court's inquiry whether Tovar wanted to represent himself at that hearing, see App. 8-9, hardly lend 
support to Tovar's suggestion of what he "may have" believed. See also id., at 46 (court's inquiry at 
sentencing whether Tovar "wanted to take some time to hire an attorney"); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8 
(2)(a) (1992) ("at any time before judgment," defendant may request withdrawal of guilty plea and 
substitution of not guilty plea). 
Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case," see Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 [*32] it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa 
Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In 
a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might 
confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court 
declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that 
the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays 
his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal 
charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the 
defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be 
wasted. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28-29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. 
We note, finally, that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance 
of an uncounseled plea they deem useful. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a) [*33] (2003); Fla. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 3.111(d) (2003); Md. Ct. Rule 4-215 (2002); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 5.02 (2003); Pa. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 121, comment (2003). We hold only that the two admonitions the Iowa Supreme Court ordered 
are not required by the Federal Constitution. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
11 Benjamin Frank Lucero (Petitioner) appeals the district court!s 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that 
while he was before the Murray City Justice Court (Justice Court), he 
was not properly advised of his constitutional right to counsel, and 
consequently did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
counsel before pleading guilty to driving under the influence of 
alcohol (DUI) in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-44 
(Supp. 2003). Petitioner argues that the record in the Justice Court 
is insufficient to allow a determination of whether the required 
colloquy between the Justice Court and Petitioner occurred and that 
the trial court should not have considered evidence outside the 
record. 
12 The Justice Court responds by first arguing that neither the 
district court nor this court has jurisdiction to hear this case 
because Petitioner failed to file a timely appeal to the district 
court for a trial de novo. The Justice Court further argues that if 
there is jurisdiction there was sufficient evidence on the record and 
through proffered and sworn testimony, for the district court to 
conclude that Petitioner was advised of his rights, and properly 
waived his right to counsel. We affirm the district court's decision, 
but on other grounds. 
BACKGROUND 
13 Petitioner was charged in the Justice Court-^- with DUI, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-44 
(Supp. 2003), and improper usage of lanes, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-61 (1998). At a bench 
trial, Petitioner appeared pro se. After pleading guilty to DUI, the 
charge of improper usage of lanes was dismissed. On June 4, 2002, 
Petitioner was sentenced to a jail term of 180 days, ordered to pay a 
fine, and placed on probation for eighteen months. Petitioner did not 
file an appeal of his conviction to the district court within the 
thirty days required by law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1) (2002). 
However, on August 1, 2002, Petitioner filed, in the Third District 
Court, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or, in the alternative, 
Motion to Correct Illegally Imposed Sentence under Rules 65B and 65C 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This petition sought an 
extraordinary writ granting his immediate release on the grounds that 
Petitioner was not represented by counsel, had not waived his right 
to counsel, and was sentenced in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
14 The Justice Court held a review hearing on September 10, 2002, 
rage J or 10 
where it suspended Petitioner's remaining jail sentence and released 
him from custody. Six days later, in the Third District Court, a 
hearing took place on Petitioner's petition for post-conviction 
relief. At this hearing, rather than challenging his plea or 
conviction, Petitioner requested that his suspended sentence be 
vacated. 
55 After testimony from Petitioner, proffered testimony of the 
Justice Court judge, and submission of affidavit testimony of two 
Justice Court clerks, the district court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law stating that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to be represented by counsel when he entered his 
plea. Petitioner filed a timely appeal to this court for review of 
the district court's order. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 Petitioner challenges the district court's dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the record was 
insufficient. The Justice Court asserts the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the petition. In addition, the Justice Court 
argues the district court properly found no violation of Petitioner's 
Sixth Amendment rights. "We review an appeal from an order dismissing 
or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness 
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Rudolph 
v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,54, 43 P.3d 467. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Appellate Review of Justice Courts 
11 We first discuss the Justice Court's argument that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner did 
not first appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. Rule 65C 
(g)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs the district 
court, upon receiving a petition for post-conviction relief, to first 
review the petition to ensure that the claims have not been 
previously adjudicated, or that the claims are not frivolous. If the 
court finds that the petition is not properly raised, the court is 
required to summarily dismiss the claims. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g) 
(1) . Additionally, Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106(1) (c) 
(2002) precludes post-conviction relief when a claim "could have been 
but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Id. In Hutchinqs v. State, 
2003 UT 52,114, 84 P.3d 1150, the Utah Supreme Court noted that rule 
65C complements section 78-35a-106 and is "designed to balance the 
'requirements of fairness and due process against the public's 
interest in the efficient adjudication . . . of post-conviction 
x t*£,V ~T V^JL 1 U 
relief cases.'" I_cL_ (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l)). Therefore, a 
district court has jurisdiction over a petition for post-conviction 
relief in order to determine its procedural correctness. 
58 In this case, it is unclear from the record whether the 
district court conducted this preliminary review required by rule 
65C. It is clear, however, that the district court did not summarily 
dismiss the petition under rule 65C, but held a hearing on the 
merits, received evidence, and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dismissing the petition.-^- As a result, the 
district court correctly assumed jurisdiction over Petitioner's 
petition. The remaining question is whether the district court should 
have summarily dismissed the petition for failure to comply with rule 
65C and section 78-35a-106. 
59 The Justice Court argues that Petitioner was required to pursue 
a direct appeal before seeking post-conviction relief.-^- The Utah 
Constitution provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have . . . the right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 
12. For criminal cases originating in justice courts, a defendant is 
provided an appeal through "a trial de novo in the district court." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1) (2002). In a trial de novo, the district 
court is "not acting in a typical appellate capacity." State v. 
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because justice 
courts are not courts of record, "the 'appeal1 does not involve a 
review of the justice court proceedings." Id. at 275. Through a trial 
de novo in the district court, "the parties essentially get a fresh 
start," and the case is tried again as if it originated there. Dean 
v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 50,59, 975 P.2d 946 (quotations and citation 
omitted). The district court's judgment after trial de novo is final 
and may not be appealed either to this court or the Utah Supreme 
Court absent an issue regarding the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7); Hinson, 966 P.2d at 276. 
"[I]n Utah, . . . it is settled that the right to an 'appeal' from a 
court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de novo in 
a court of record." City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah 1990). 
510 In this case, after being sentenced, Petitioner chose not to 
appeal his plea or conviction to the district court for a trial de 
novo. It is clear, however, that a trial de novo would have remedied 
any constitutional defects suffered by Petitioner in the Justice 
Court. Instead, nearly two months after sentencing in the Justice 
Court, Petitioner filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with 
the district court. 
511 "A petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral attack 
on a conviction and sentence and is not a substitute for direct 
appellate review." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,55, 43 P.3d 467. The 
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Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated sections 78-35a-101 
to -110 (2002), precludes post-conviction relief when a claim "could 
have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-106 (1) (c). The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated this 
prohibition, but with one exception. "[I]ssues that were not 
addressed on direct appeal but could have been raised may not be 
raised for the first time in a post-conviction relief proceeding 
absent unusual circumstances." Rudolph, 2002 UT 7, at 55 (emphasis 
added). The supreme court further defined unusual circumstances as 
those that "show that there was an obvious injustice or a substantial 
and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Carter v. Galetka, 
2001 UT 96,515, 44 P.3d 626 (quotations and citation omitted); see 
also Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978) (stating that 
exigent circumstances exist where there "has been such unfairness or 
failure to accord due process of law that it would be wholly 
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction" (footnote omitted)). 
512 Petitioner argues that his inability to have the Justice 
Court's denial of counsel reviewed by the district court on a direct 
appeal is unique and presents "unusual circumstances" with an 
"obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right" warranting review. Carter, 2001 UT 96 at 115 
(quotation and citations omitted). However, we are not persuaded that 
Petitioner, in fact, suffered from an obvious injustice. To the 
contrary, the structure of Utah's justice court system ensures that 
when a defendant believes he or she has been deprived of a 
constitutional right by a justice court, that individual is entitled 
to a new trial in the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 
(1) (2002); Henriod, 1999 UT App 50 at 59. Voluntarily eschewing the 
opportunity to remedy a constitutional violation through a trial de 
novo does not create unusual circumstances permitting a petition for 
post-conviction relief. By rejecting a trial de novo, Petitioner 
acceded to any undesired result of the Justice Court's sentence. ^ -
Therefore, we hold that Petitioner did not suffer a "substantial and 
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right," Carter, 2001 UT 96 at 
515 (quotations and citations omitted), because he had the 
opportunity to remedy his alleged denial of counsel, and chose not to 
pursue that opportunity.-^- Because we conclude that the unusual 
circumstances exception does not apply in this case, Petitioner was 
precluded under Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106 from obtaining 
relief through a petition for post-conviction relief. Given our 
holding that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner's 
petition for post-conviction relief and our disposition of this case 
on that ground, we do not address the correctness of the trial 
court's findings and conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
113 Petitioner failed to file a timely appeal to the district 
court for a trial de novo. A trial de novo would have remedied any 
constitutional violations Petitioner may have suffered in the Justice 
Court. After obtaining counsel, or properly waiving his right to 
counsel, Petitioner could have either pleaded guilty again, or 
challenged the charges in a trial. Defendant has not demonstrated 
unusual circumstances consisting of "an obvious injustice or 
substantial prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Carter, 
2001 UT 96 at 115. Thus, he has not established an exception to the 
rule prohibiting post-conviction relief when the petitioner has not 
first sought relief by direct appeal. We 
accordingly affirm the result of the district court, but for the 
reasons explained above. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
114 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
115 I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. 
I. The District Court's Jurisdiction to 
Hear a Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
116 It is unquestionably true that a defendant's right to appeal a 
justice court conviction to a district court for a trial de novo 
satisfies the various state and federal constitutional guarantees 
relating to due process and the right to appeal. See, e.g., North v. 
Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 337, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 2713 (1976); City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). The 
question before us, however, is not one of constitutional propriety, 
but is instead a question of statutory interpretation. Specifically, 
the question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear 
Lucero's petition for post-conviction relief hinges upon our 
reconciliation of two different statutory provisions. The first is 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120 (Supp. 2002) , which dictates the 
manner by which defendants can appeal justice court convictions. That 
section is entitled "Appeals from justice court," and provides that, 
"[i]n a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in 
the district court." Id^ § 78-5-120(1). The second is Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-35a-106 (1996), which establishes the means by 
which a defendant can petition for post-conviction relief under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-
106 to -110 (1996). Section 78-35a-106(1) states that "[a] person is 
not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: (a) 
may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial 
motion." (Emphasis added.) The question before us, then, is whether a 
trial de novo qualifies as a "direct appeal." Id. The majority 
concludes that it does, and therefore rules that Lucerofs failure to 
file for a trial de novo precludes him from petitioning for post-
conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. I disagree. 
fl7 I first examine the meaning of the phrase "direct appeal." 
There is no provision in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act that 
specifically defines what constitutes a "direct appeal" for purposes 
of section 78-35a-106, nor is there a provision anywhere in the Utah 
Code defining that specific phrase for purposes of any other 
particular statutory scheme.-^- Accordingly, we must interpret the 
meaning of this phrase using the accepted rules of statutory 
interpretation. "When interpreting statutes, we determine the 
statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, 
and give effect to the plain language unless the language is 
ambiguous." Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commfn, 2004 
UT 11,517, 84 P.3d 1197. As I see it, a party receives a "direct 
appeal" when an appellate tribunal conducts a case-specific, ruling-
specific review of the lower court proceedings. This understanding 
comports with the limited discussion that this phrase has received in 
various Utah courts. See, e.g., Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2002 UT 77,1518-19, 52 P.3d 1267 (referring to a "direct 
appeal" as a "direct review"); see also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22,f25, 70 P.3d 111 (distinguishing "direct appeals" from collateral 
attacks). Accordingly, Utah courts have used the phrase "direct 
appeal" to refer to a variety of situations in which appellate 
tribunals undertook a case-specific, ruling-specific review of the 
proceedings below. See, e.g., Hutchinqs v. State, 2003 UT 52,116, 84 
P.3d 1150 (referring to an appellate review of a probation revocation 
as a "direct appeal"); Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128,16, 63 P.3d 672 
(stating that such issues as the validity of a search warrant, the 
admissibility of a confession, and the correctness of a bindover 
order are reviewable on "direct appeal"); Salazar v. Utah State 
Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 n.6 (Utah 1993) (referring to an appellate 
review of a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as a "direct 
appeal"). Applied to the present case, a trial de novo would 
therefore only constitute a "direct appeal" of the justice court 
conviction if it provided the district court with the opportunity to 
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conduct a case-specific, ruling-specific review of the justice court 
proceedings. 
518 I now turn to the scope of review provided by a "trial de 
novo." In Pledger v. Cox, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he 
words fde novo1 . . . have at least two possible interpretations when 
applied to judicial review . . . : !(1) A complete retrial upon new 
evidence; and (2) a trial upon the record made before the lower 
tribunal.1" 626 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1981) (quoting Denver & R.G.W.R. 
Co. v. Public Serv. CommTn, 98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552 (1940)). 
Though "[t]he meaning of ftrial de novo' in each statute is obviously 
dictated by the wording and context of the statute in which it 
appears," id., a trial de novo that is conducted following a 
defendant's justice court conviction follows the first definition— 
that of a "complete retrial upon new evidence." Id. This comports 
with the definition offered by Black's Law Dictionary, wherein "trial 
de novo" is defined as "[a] new trial on the entire case—that is, on 
both questions of fact and issues of law." Black's Law Dictionary 
1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999). Thus, "[b]ecause a justice of the peace 
court in this state is not a court of record, an appeal from that 
court is by way of a trial de novo in the district court, rather than 
a review of the justice's rulings." Wisden v. District Ct., 694 P. 2d 
605, 606 (Utah 1984). 
119 Because it acts "as if there had been no trial in the first 
instance," Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999), a 
district court conducting a trial de novo "is not confined to the 
record before the justice court and need not defer to the justice 
court's findings and determinations. The district court neither 
reverses nor affirms the judgment of the justice court, but renders a 
new, distinct, and independent judgment." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 
273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). When a district court conducts a trial 
de novo review of a justice court conviction, "the case [stands] 
precisely as it would have at that stage of the proceedings if it had 
begun in that court in the first instance." Id. ; accord Dean v. 
Henriod, 1999 UT App 50,19 n.l, 975 P.2d 946.^-
520 When confronted with possible statutory conflicts that might 
preclude a defendant from seeking post-conviction relief, "any 
ambiguity that may exist . . . should be resolved in favor of a 
criminal defendant." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990). 
Against this backdrop, I think that the majority's decision to deny 
Lucero post-conviction relief based on his failure to request a trial 
de novo is simply incorrect. Had Lucero requested a trial de novo, 
the district court would have been required to act as if "the 
proceedings had begun in that court in the first instance." Hinson, 
966 P.2d at 276. As such, Lucero would not have had the opportunity 
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to focus his "appeal" on the particular legal conclusions or factual 
findings of the justice court that he believed were erroneous. 
Lucerofs trial de novo would not have been a framed, particularized 
proceeding that was directed at the review of specific alleged 
errors; instead, the district court conducting the trial de novo 
would have acted as a broad, general tribunal that would have 
examined the charges anew. Insofar as this avenue of appeal would 
simply not have given Lucero the opportunity to directly challenge 
any alleged errors below, I think it clear that the trial de novo 
cannot be regarded as a "direct appeal. "-^-
121 As I see it, the plain language of the statutory scheme thus 
provides a defendant who has been convicted in a justice court 
proceeding with two separate avenues of relief. First, the defendant 
can exercise his statutory right to file for a trial de novo. The 
advantages of this course would be clear: though the defendant would 
not have the opportunity to have the trial court review any potential 
errors that occurred below, the defendant would have the opportunity 
under this fresh start to try and persuade a new finder of fact of 
his or her innocence. Should the defendant choose not to file for a 
trial de novo, however, the defendant is still allowed to petition a 
district court for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. In this hearing, the trial court would have the 
authority to directly review the proceedings in the justice court to 
determine whether any constitutional error occurred.-^- In this case, 
Lucero properly and validly chose the second option, and the trial 
court correctly determined that it did have jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of Lucerofs petition for post-conviction relief. I would 
accordingly conclude that the majority's reversal of that threshold 
determination is in error. 
II. Lucero's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
SI22 Because of my conclusion that Lucero did have a right to 
petition for post-conviction relief, I think that we are obligated to 
review the district court's determination that Lucerofs waiver of the 
right to counsel at the justice court proceeding was constitutionally 
valid. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, I would 
conclude that Lucero did not validly waive his right to counsel and 
that the district court's denial of Lucero's petition for post-
conviction relief should accordingly be reversed. 
123 "The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal 
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously 
protected by the trial court." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 
(Utah 1998). "Because of the importance of the right to counsel and 
the heavy burden placed upon the trial court to protect this right, 
there is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver 
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must be resolved in the defendant's favor." Id. However, because the 
right to assistance of counsel is "personal in nature," State v. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987), the right "may be waived by 
a competent accused if the waiver is 'knowingly and intelligently1 
made." Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 
629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Further, the relevant Utah cases 
establish that there is a distinction between the "knowingly" and the 
"intelligently" prongs of the waiver test. 
"Intelligent" in this context means "only that the defendant has been 
provided with adequate information on which to make his or her self-
representation choice. Because such a choice is seldom, if ever, a 
wise one, 'intelligent1 does not carry that meaning here." "Knowing" 
refers to a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel, 
similar to a defendant's competence to stand trial . . . . 
State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations 
omitted). 
524 Before determining that a defendant has knowingly and 
intelligently waived his or her right to counsel, a trial court has 
an affirmative duty to "conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant" 
in order to ensure "that the defendant's waiver of counsel is 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 
918. Though a colloquy on the record is not required, see State v. 
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159,5520-22, 27 P.3d 573, it is "the preferred 
method of ascertaining the validity of a waiver because it insures 
that defendants understand the risks of self-representation." 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. "Where there is no colloquy, [appellate 
courts] 'will look at any evidence in the record'" created in the 
district court in order to ascertain whether the district court has 
fulfilled its duty of inquiry. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159 at 122 
(quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188).-^-
525 In explaining the contours of this required inquiry, the 
United States Supreme Court has stated that the defendant "should be 
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" 
prior to the trial court's acceptance of a waiver of the right to 
counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 
2541 (1974). In accordance with the United States Supreme Court's 
unquestioned authority over questions of federal constitutional law, 
Utah courts have long enforced the Faretta directive as part of the 
Sixth Amendment analysis. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; Frampton, 737 
P.2d at 188; State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981); State 
v. Dominquez, 564 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1977); State v. Petty, 2001 
UT App 396,58, 
38 P.3d 998; Valencia, 2001 UT App 159 at 522; McDonald, 922 P.2d at 
779; Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 633.-^ 
126 The proper scope of the Faretta directive was recently 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 
U.S. , 124 S. Ct. 1379, 2004 U.S. Lexis 1837, * (2004).-^- In Tovar, 
the defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol. See id. at *10. An intoxilyzer test 
administered the night of the defendant's arrest showed that he had a 
blood alcohol level that was well above the legal limit. See id. At 
his arraignment, the defendant informed the court that he wished to 
waive his right to counsel and that he wished to plead guilty. See 
id. at *12. The court accordingly conducted a plea colloquy in which 
the court explained that the defendant had the right to be 
represented at trial by an attorney who "could help [the defendant] 
select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, 
present evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the 
judge and jury on [his] behalf." Id. at *12-13 (second and third 
alterations in original). After receiving this and other warnings, 
the defendant affirmed his wish to waive his right to counsel and to 
plead guilty. See id. at *14. 
127 Several years later, the defendant was arrested for a third 
DUI offense, and accordingly sought to challenge his prior guilty 
plea as a means of avoiding a recidivist sentence enhancement. See 
id. at *16-17. After proceeding through the lower Iowa courts, the 
Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the original waiver was 
constitutionally invalid due to the fact that the defendant had not 
been informed of "the dangers of self-representation." Id. at *19 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
128 On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 
See id. at *33. In reversing, the Court held that "[t]he information 
a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election . . 
. will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the 
defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily 
grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding." Id. 
at *23 (emphasis added). While the Faretta directive is still 
required before a court accepts a waiver of counsel before trial, see 
id. at *23-24, "at the earlier stages of the criminal process, a less 
searching or formal colloquy may suffice." 16^ at *24. Quoting prior 
precedent, the Court explained that "[w]e require less rigorous 
warnings pretrial . . . not because pretrial proceedings are 'less 
important' than trial, but because, at that stage, 'the full dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial 
and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.'" I_d_. at *26 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
129 Endorsing a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," id. 
at *25 (quotations and citations omitted), the Court ultimately 
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concluded that the inquiry must rest on "the particular facts and 
circumstances" of each case. See id. at *3. Analyzing the Tovar 
litigation, the Court concluded that there was not a "realistic" 
"prospect" that a "meritorious defense" would have existed for Tovar 
at trial or that the defendant could have pled "to a lesser charge." 
Id. at *32. Because "the admonitions at issue might confuse or 
mislead a defendant [in such a scenario] more than they would inform 
him," id., the Court ultimately concluded that the lower court did 
not err by failing to inform Tovar of the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation. 
230 Counsel for the Murray City Justice Court argues that Tovar 
mandates affirmance in the present case. I disagree with that 
proposition. While it may be true that Tovar will require a 
reexamination of our "dangers and disadvantages" jurisprudence, at 
least as applied to waivers at a plea hearing, the facts of the 
present case do not require such a reexamination here. As discussed 
above, the Tovar ruling was expressly predicated on the unquestioned 
evidence that Tovar would have had no "realistic" alternatives to 
pleading guilty. Id. at *32. Further, the trial court in Tovar did 
conduct an on-record colloquy in which the court advised Tovar of 
some of the advantages that having an attorney would have offered. 
See id. at *13. In the present case, however, there is a complete 
absence of evidence from which we could similarly conclude that 
Lucero lacked a realistic prospect of success at trial or in 
negotiations with prosecutors. There is likewise no evidence that 
Lucero was informed by the justice court of any of the advantages of 
having counsel present at the hearing. Our supreme court has 
previously held that "there is a presumption against waiver." Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 917. Given this presumption, I think that we are 
obligated to conclude that Lucero was not informed of how the right 
to counsel would have applied "in general in the circumstances," 
Tovar, 2004 U.S. Lexis 1837 at *29 (emphasis omitted), and that 
Lucerofs waiver of the right to counsel was thus invalid. As such, I 
would reverse the district court's dismissal of Lucerofs petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Under Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-101 (2002), justice courts 
are courts "not of record." 
2. The Justice Court likewise argues that this court does not have 
jurisdiction over this case. However, the court of appeals has 
jurisdiction to review a district court's denial of a petition for 
post-conviction relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-
3(2) (f) (2002). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(o). 
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3. Petitioner argues that because the Justice Court did not raise 
this issue before the district court, it is now barred because it 
would constitute an alternative ground for affirmance not apparent on 
the record nor sustainable by the factual findings. See State v. 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,19, 76 P.3d 1159. However, "[jJurisdictional 
issues may be raised for the first time on appeal." M.M.J, v. R.N.J., 
908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, Petitioner's 
argument is moot because we have determined the district court had 
jurisdiction. 
4. Through his post-conviction relief petition, Petitioner does not 
challenge the Justice Court plea or conviction. Instead, for reasons 
not apparent to this court, he seeks only a dismissal of the 
remaining suspended sentence. 
5. The Justice Court also argues that Petitioner should be precluded 
from bringing a petition for post-conviction relief because he did 
not explain why he failed to take a direct appeal. In support of this 
argument, it cites Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), and Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987), where 
the courts held that in addition to showing an obvious injustice, the 
defendants were required to explain why they did not take a direct 
appeal. However, Summers and Wells were both decided prior to the 
enactment of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated 
sections 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002), which does not require such an 
initial showing of why a direct appeal was not taken. We note that 
even though a defendant is not required to explain why he did not 
bring a direct appeal, such an explanation may be helpful in showing 
extraordinary circumstances. 
1. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "direct appeal" as "[a]n appeal 
from a trial court's decision directly to the jurisdiction's highest 
court, thus bypassing review by an intermediate appellate court." 
Black's Law Dictionary 94 (7th ed. deluxe 1999). A review of the Utah 
cases, however, indicates that this strict definition is not followed 
by our courts. In Pascual v. Carver, for example, the Utah Supreme 
Court referred to the defendant's prior appeal, which had been heard 
in the Utah Court of Appeals, as a "direct appeal" of the conviction. 
876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). Similarly, in State v. Lara, we 
referred to an appeal of a bindover order that was heard in this 
court as a "direct appeal." 2003 UT App 318,120, 79 P.3d 951. 
2. Given this construct, Utah courts have insisted that though a 
district court exercises its "appellate jurisdiction" when conducting 
a trial de novo, State v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), the trials de novo that are held before the district courts 
must not be characterized in the same manner as a standard appeal 
which is held before the court of appeals or supreme court. In State 
v. Hinson, this court clearly drew this distinction, therein 
declaring that certain rules governing a case filed "[i]n a 
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conventional appeal environment . . . [have] no place in an appeal 
from a justice court judgment." 966 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) . Similarly, we emphasized in Dean v. Henriod that there is a 
distinction between a "traditional appeal" and "an appeal from 
justice court." 1999 UT App 50,319 n.l, 975 P.2d 946. Thus, when a 
district court conducts a trial de novo, the district court is "not 
acting in a typical appellate capacity." Hinson, 966 P.2d at 276. In 
a related context, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that, because 
a district court has the authority to make findings of fact in its 
trial de novo review of Industrial Commission decisions, the district 
court should be viewed "as an independent fact finder and not as an 
intermediate appellate court." University of Utah v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) (emphasis omitted). 
3. There is some confusion as to whether Murray City Justice Court's 
argument is predicated on Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106(1) 
(a) (1996) (precluding relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
where the petition is based on a ground that "may still be raised on 
direct appeal") or whether it is instead predicated on Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-35a-106(1)(c) (1996) (precluding relief under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act where the petition is based on a 
ground that "could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal"). Though Murray City Justice Court's brief did not specify 
which of these subsections its argument was predicated on, the brief 
did directly discuss Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-102(1) 
(1996), which states that relief is appropriate where a defendant has 
"exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct 
appeal." (Emphasis added.) Given this reference, and given the 
repeated references throughout the remainder of the brief to Lucero's 
failure to exercise his rights to a "direct appeal," I think it clear 
that any specific argument arising under Utah Code Annotated section 
78-35a-106 (1) (c) is not properly before us. 
Even were we to consider the subtle differences embodied by 
section 78-35a-106(1)(c), however, I think that the result here would 
be the same. As discussed above, though the trial de novo is 
considered to be the form by which a defendant can "appeal" his or 
her justice court conviction, it is still nevertheless true that the 
district court conducting the trial de novo cannot consider any 
particular claims of error that might have arisen below. Thus, 
insofar as the defendant in such circumstances cannot "raise" any 
issues in his "appeal," I think that the result under either section 
78-35a-106(1) (a) or section 78-35a-106(1) (c) would be the same. 
4. At oral argument, Murray City Justice Court argued that allowing 
defendants who are convicted in justice court to have two separate 
avenues of appellate relief is unnecessary and duplicative. This 
concern, however, is misplaced. Instead, I think that there is a 
certain degree of logic present in allowing a defendant to bypass the 
trial de novo stage and instead directly appeal for post-conviction 
relief. The financial costs and emotional tolls that are involved in 
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having to prepare for and go through a trial de novo can be heavy. In 
situations where a defendant has suffered a clear constitutional 
wrong at the justice court level, it would seem patently unjust to 
require the defendant to pay for and endure a full trial before 
allowing the defendant any access to direct appellate review. 
Instead, I think that our statutory scheme is wise in allowing 
defendants in such situations to immediately petition a court for 
redress under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, while at the same 
time allowing defendants who are willing to proceed to trial the 
opportunity to pursue that course of action instead. Regardless, I 
again note that this appears to be the statutorily created system. 
Thus, I see no option but to conclude that, as presently constituted, 
the Utah Code does allow a defendant to choose between these two 
different forms of relief. 
5. In its brief and again at oral argument, counsel for Lucero 
asserted that, insofar as justice court proceedings are not conducted 
on the record, our review of this case should be limited to the 
information contained in the justice court docket or filings. The 
cases state, however, that an appellate court reviewing a waiver of 
that right must be able to look at "' any evidence in the record"' in 
order to determine whether the right was properly waived. State v. 
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159,122, 27 P.3d 273 (emphasis added) (quoting 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987)); accord State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 
776, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Similarly, I also note my disagreement with Lucerofs assertion 
that the trial court in this case should not have received testimony 
from witnesses in its efforts to ascertain whether the waiver 
proceedings at the justice court were constitutionally valid. In 
State v. Gutierrez, the defendant sought to challenge the application 
of a repeat offender DUI enhancement statute to his case, therein 
arguing that his prior convictions were each invalid. See 2003 UT App 
95,112-5, 68 P. 3d 1035. As part of his challenge, the defendant 
argued that one of his prior guilty pleas, entered at a justice 
court, had been involuntary. See id. at 19. In upholding the use of 
the justice court guilty plea by the trial court, we concluded that 
Gutierrez had failed to prove involuntariness. See id. at 112. 
Addressing Gutierrez's concerns about how he could have established 
such proof where the justice court keeps no official record, we noted 
that "Gutierrez could have produced testimony from those who were 
present regarding the taking of his plea, the court's docket sheet, 
or other affirmative evidence." Id. In spite of this clear holding, 
Lucero suggests that there is a distinction between the trial court's 
use of such testimony for purposes of sentence enhancement and for 
use when the trial court reviews a petition for post-conviction 
relief. I disagree with that attempted distinction. In both 
situations, the trial court is simply exercising its authority to 
review the lower proceedings in order to determine whether they were 
constitutionally valid. Given the important nature of this solemn 
responsibility, I see no reason why the trial court should be limited 
in its ability to inquire as to what occurred in the justice court 
proceedings. Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial courtTs use 
of testimony and extrinsic evidence in this case was proper. 
6. Counsel for Murray City Justice Court points us to language in 
McDonald, wherein we stated that "a recommendation by the court 
against self-representation is not necessary for a defendant to 
intelligently waive the right to counsel." 922 P.2d at 785. Murray 
City Justice Court argues that this language obviates the duty of 
inquiry discussed above. I disagree. A careful reading of the 
precedent discussed above indicates that the trial court's specific 
duty here is to ensure that the defendant understands the "dangers 
and disadvantages" of self-representation. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 
(emphasis added); accord McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779. Though subtle, 
there is a clear distinction between a rule requiring the court to 
inform a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation and one requiring the court to take the further step 
of actually advising the defendant not to represent himself or 
herself. The former is simply a fulfillment of the court's duty to 
ensure that the defendant has the proper information; the latter 
would put the trial court into the role of advisor to the defendant, 
a role that would clearly be impermissible. As discussed below, a 
subsequent decision by the United States Supreme Court may indicate 
that a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation is not required at all stages of litigation. However, 
I would stress here that our statement in McDonald regarding the lack 
of a "recommendation" requirement does not remove the duty of inquiry 
from trial courts before accepting a counsel waiver at the trial 
setting. 
6. Though Tovar was concededly decided after the events at issue here 
took place, it is a "long standing traditional rule . . . that the 
law established by a court decision applies both prospectively and 
retrospectively, even when the decision overrules prior case law." 
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,126, 44 P.3d 626 (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
